ANALYSIS: Africa must prepare for Trump’s comeback

President Joe Biden’s recent trip to Angola – the first state visit by a United States (US) president in nine years – has highlighted America’s renewed engagement with Africa. But as Donald Trump prepares for his second term in office, questions arise about the future of US-Africa relations, and whether this engagement will continue.

Mr Trump’s first term, characterised by an inward-focused ‘America First’ agenda, showed the need for Africa to recalibrate its strategies – particularly in strategic geopolitical and security engagements. Several key issues at bilateral, regional and continental levels will be impacted by his second-term policies and the priorities of his inner circle.

Mr Trump’s return presents African countries with an opportunity to take a proactive stance in shaping their political and economic relations with the US and developing resilient strategies instead of reacting to shifting US policies.

Key bilateral relationships, particularly between the US and South Africa, are expected to shift – stemming from US opposition to South Africa’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Israel over Gaza, and the country’s close ties with China and Russia.

In particular, South Africa’s neutral position on the Russia-Ukraine war will be a point of tension in a second Trump presidency. The president is also opposed to South Africa’s growing partnership with China, which is amplified by China’s efforts to direct global trade away from the US and BRICS’ attempt at de-dollarisation, a move criticised by Mr Trump.

Notable figures in Mr Trump’s camp will also likely affect US-South Africa relations. For example, Marco Rubio, the presumptive Secretary of State and a strong critic of China, condemned South Africa’s decision to downgrade Taiwan’s embassy.

Mr Trump’s pick for UN Ambassador, Elise Stefanik, was part of a petition condemning South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel, calling it an attempt to ‘demonise’ Israel. Michael Waltz led a push to review US-South Africa ties, a move Mr Biden resisted, but with Ms Waltz as Trump’s pick for National Security Advisor, it could gain momentum.

South Africa assumed the G20 chair on 1 December and will host the 2025 Johannesburg summit. The country now faces a dual challenge of maintaining neutrality while addressing growing geopolitical divisions – seeking to build consensus among G20 members and an expanded BRICS group while managing a more isolationist US under Mr Trump’s leadership.

This also presents an opportunity for Pretoria to spotlight African priorities on the global stage, especially with the African Union (AU), now a full member of the G20. With the US succeeding South Africa as chair, this transition could pave the way for a possible Cyril Ramaphosa-Trump engagement within the year, offering a critical window for dialogue and potential recalibration of relations.

In East Africa, Kenya’s newly elevated status as a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (MN-NATO) ally could offer Nairobi some bargaining chips in the international space. Despite Mr Trump’s America First policy and negative views on NATO, he may temper his approach by focusing on strategic bilateral partnerships with MN-NATO allies, like Kenya.

The new US administration will probably continue its security relations in East Africa and the Horn – largely due to Mr Rubio’s visit to Kenya and Somalia in 2019, part of a bipartisan oversight mission for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Furthermore, because of the declining US security influence in West Africa, resulting from successive coups and the subsequent expulsion of US troops from Niger, maintaining the security partnership with Kenya is expected to remain a priority.

And given the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti, US-Kenya bilateral engagements might move the needle towards securing commitment to America’s over $300 million funding pledge to the mission. However, this would be a tall order given the Trump camp’s reluctance to fund the UN, and peacekeeping in particular – despite the US proposing the resolution to replace the Kenyan-led MSS with a UN mission.

Mr Trump’s preference is for strategic partners to take up more of the burden without the US overextending its resources – so Kenya must look beyond the US for support.

On the regional front, perhaps the most contentious area is the Horn of Africa. The controversial Project 2025 document of proposals produced by the conservative Heritage Foundation chapter on the State Department includes the recognition of Somaliland as a hedge against China’s growing influence in Djibouti.

This aligns with former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Tibor Nagy, who served in Mr Trump’s first term and advocated for its recognition. Although denied by Mr Trump, Project 2025 is predominantly written by key former Trump officials, including the State Department chapter author, Kiron Skinner. Supporting this are optimistic statements of Somaliland recognition from former UK defence secretary Gavin Williamson after discussions with Mr Trump’s policy leads.

This could complicate US-Somalia and US-Ethiopia relations, as it will intensify brewing tensions over Ethiopia’s Red Sea access deal with Somaliland, much to the chagrin of Somalia, which has sought alliances with Egypt and Eritrea to counter them. Whether this is followed through will be crucial in determining the success of the AU’s Ethiopia-Somalia mediation efforts.

On a continental level, how the US responds to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform proposals will matter to Africa. Current UN Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield has expressed support for Africa securing a permanent seat (albeit without veto) on the UNSC. Will the Trump administration continue this momentum?

Given Mr Trump’s first-term attempts at defunding the UN and preference for bilateral over multilateral relations, momentum for UNSC reform in Africa’s favour will unlikely increase under Mr Trump’s second term. Regardless, Africa must address its internal divisions on how the two seats outlined in the Ezulwini Consensus will be allocated.

A more consequential area facing US-Africa relations would be the US’s position and contribution to UNSC Resolution 2719, a mechanism designed to fund AU-led peace support operations (PSOs). America is the largest contributor to UN PSOs, at 27 per cent of the 2023-24 $6.1-billion budget. Within months of Mr Trump’s first term, the US successfully lobbied to reduce the UN peacekeeping budget by $600 million, although they aimed for an initial $1 billion reduction.

Although the resolution will be maintained, the case-by-case basis on which authorisation must be supported might present a significant challenge for Africa. UNSC discussions on implementation of 2719 in Somalia, for example, attract a strong negative US pushback.

Whether Mr Trump maintains America’s renewed focus on Africa will depend on aligning US and African interests – despite their diversity – and Washington’s push to counter Russia and China’s growing influence. Regardless of the US’s policy trajectory, Africa must be prepared.